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The Refugee Act of 19801 attempted to establish a uniform and nonideological procedure for considering applications by refugees for political asylum in the United States. 2 Charges persist, however, that foreign policy and ideology still dominate the government's adjudication and litigation of asylum claims, thereby thwarting the goals of the Act.' Even when a refugee presents a strong asylum claim, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) generally contests the application by appealing an Immigration Judge's (IJ) decision. 4 Although IJ denials of strong asylum claims have been reversed or remanded by the federal courts, 5 few asylum seekers have the resources to appeal. 8 This Note argues that unjustified government opposition to meritorious asylum claims should be countered through the application of a federal I. THE EAJA: TERMS AND BASIC PURPOSE
A. History of Fee Award Provisions
The EAJA, originally enacted as an experiment, 12 significantly changed existing law by permitting attorneys' fees awards against the government in civil actions and in adversary agency adjudications. Under the common law "American Rule," parties in litigation traditionally pay for their own attorneys' fees and costs, except where attorneys' fees are specifically authorized by statute. 13 The American Rule became subject to increasing attack in the 1960's and 1970's, and courts began to experiment with new exceptions to the doctrine. 1 The most significant of these new judicial exceptions, the "private attorney general" theory, 15 was abolished in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.' 6 In response to Alyeska, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,11 which permitted prevailing parties in actions brought under certain civil rights statutes to collect attorneys' fees. Four years later, Congress enacted a far more comprehensive attorneys' fees bill, the EAJA, to enable small parties,' who might otherwise be unable to afford to assert 12. The EAJA was passed with a sunset clause under which its key provisions expired automatically in 1984. Pub. L. No. 96-481, § § 203(c) , 204(c), 94 Stat. 2325 94 Stat. , 2327 94 Stat. , 2329 94 Stat. (1982 . In 1985, Congress passed new legislation which permanently reenacted and amended the EAJA in important respects. Equal Access to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28 U.S.C. 2412 (Supp. IV 1986) ).
The EAJA has been supported by an unusual coalition of small business organizations, whose members are often victims of unjustified government actions, and civil rights groups. H.R. REP 13. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v . Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) . The American Rule was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) . There are two traditional narrow common law exceptions to the rule: when the losing party has acted in "bad faith" he may be obliged to pay attorney fees (bad faith exception), or when a successful party preserves or creates a benefit for a group, the court may permit her to recover fees from the beneficiaries (common benefit exception). See Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1983) .
Congress has enacted many specific statutory exceptions to the American Rule. For a sample list, see H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12, at 4987.
14. See Spencer, 712 F.2d at 544. 15. This theory allowed private plaintiffs to collect attorneys' fees against private parties, even in the absence of specific statutory authority, when their suits vindicated certain public rights. Id. at 544 n.15. Courts that followed this doctrine reasoned that when litigants helped enforce certain broad rights and interests promoted by, for example, civil rights and environmental legislation, they should not have to pay the costs of the litigation. Winold, Institutionalizing an Experiment: The Extension of the Equal Access to Justice Act -Questions Resolved, Questions Remaining, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 925, 927 (1987) .
16. 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975) ("[Clongressional utilization of the private-attorney-general concept can in no way be construed as a grant of authority to the Judiciary to jettison the [American] rule.").
17. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988). 18. Eligibility for an EAJA award is limited to individuals with a net worth of less than $2 million, businesses with a net worth of less than $7 million and nonprofit organizations of any size. 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986) . their legal rights, to defend against or seek review of unreasonable government action. 19 
B. Purposes of the EAJA
The EAJA has three principal purposes. First, the EAJA seeks to aid victims of unjustified government action who might be deterred by the cost of litigation from legally contesting such action. 2 " Congress intended the EAJA to prevent the government from coercing compliance with its position merely because the affected individuals lacked the funds to litigate against the government. 2 1 Congress wanted to ensure that individuals, small businesses, and other organizations would decide on the merits rather than on their fear of high attorneys' fees whether or not to defend against or seek review of unjustified government action. 22 A second goal of the EAJA is to deter such unjustified government action by the threat of sizeable awards of attorneys' fees which would come from agency budgets." 3 By requiring that the government prove that its position is substantially justified or face liability for a fee award, 4 Congress also intended to "caution agencies to carefully evaluate their case and not to pursue those which are weak or tenuous." A third objective is to expose, by statutory revival of the private attorney general theory, 2 6 more governmental action to "adversarial testing... to refine the administration of federal law-to foster greater precision, efficiency and fairness in the interpretation of statutes and in the formulation and enforcement of governmental regulations. 2 7 Congress felt that the EAJA would promote more agency adjudications, which would often bring to light and correct inaccurate or erroneous agency policy or action. 28
19. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12, at 4988. The EAJA is a general statutory exception to the American Rule. Only common law and specific statutory exceptions to the American Rule existed prior to the enactment of the EAJA. Id. at 4986-87.
20. The American Rule was based on a desire not to deter litigation by penalizing a losing party for having brought or defended a lawsuit. But, the House Report concluded: "[Iun litigation with the Government, the American rule is in fact having the opposite effect. For many citizens, the costs of securing vindication of their rights and the inability to recover attorney fees preclude resort to the adjudicatory process." Id. at 4988. 
C. Key Terms of the EAJA
To win an EAJA award an applicant must show that she is an eligible "prevailing party." 29 Courts have generally held that to be a "prevailing party" one need only succeed on any significant issue which achieves some of the benefit sought by the parties. 3 0 The government must then show that its "position" 3 ' in the adjudication was "substantially justified," 2 or that "special circumstances" would make an award unjust, 3 or it will be liable for an EAJA fee award. 4 29. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986) ; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1986 Supp. IV) . For example, if the government is a defendant it may present a technical defense, such as lack of jurisdiction, which is unrelated to the merits of the underlying action. Although the government may lose, by presenting only that defense-assuming that lack of jurisdiction is a substantially justified, or reasonable, legal argument-the government could escape liability for EAJA fees under the litigation theory, regardless of how unreasonable its original action was.
Congress in 1985 ratified the broader "underlying action" approach, in which the court or Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reviewing a fee application would look at both the government's legal arguments and the prelitigation facts of the case on the record to make the substantial justification determination. Court recently addressed the split in the circuits concerning the interpretation of the "substantially justified" standard. In Pierce v. Underwood, 108 S. Ct. 2541 (1988), the Court held that the standard should be essentially one of reasonableness. This ruling may limit the effectiveness of the EAJA and reduce government liability for awards, given that since the 1985 reenactment of the EAJA, many courts had been imposing a higher, "more than mere reasonableness" standard on the government. 638 (7th Cir. 1987 ), a former employee of a small company had sought backpay after proving that she had been wrongfully discharged. An NLRB official investigating the case wrote to the company twice, first directing payment of $920 to the employee, but then later demanding payment of more than $5,000, based on an affidavit by the employee which falsely claimed that her tax returns were erroneous and that she had suffered a loss of income after her discharge. The company refused to pay such a large amount and a hearing was set solely to determine the amount of backpay. Before the start of the hearing the company offered to pay the original determination of $920. But the NLRB General Counsel rejected this settlement offer and at the hearing the ALJ found that the company owed only $631, even less than the original NLRB demand. Id. at 640-41.
Having prevailed in the NLRB adjudication, the company sought attorneys' fees by filing an EAJA application with the ALJ. The ALJ dismissed the application, and a panel of the NLRB affirmed, on the grounds that the NLRB General Counsel's position in the case was substantially justified because its legal arguments at the hearing were reasonable. Id. at 641.
The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the NLRB panel's denial of fees because it was based on the wrong legal standard and was unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. at 643. The court found EAJA awards for attorneys' fees in agency adjudications have been rare. In the first three years after the passage of the EAJA, the number of applications and awards and the total dollar amount of all EAJA awards fell far below expectations. 5 The lack of applications and the low number of awards were particularly striking in administrative agency adjudications, where Congress had believed that many awards would be made. 3 6 Even when the number and amount of court awards increased, 37 the number of administrative awards remained extremely low leading many to proclaim the EAJA a failure in agency proceedings. 8 An alternative explanation is that during the Reagan years there has been less agency activity and fewer enforcement initiatives which would spur EAJA applications. 39 In either case the consistently small number of agency applications and the low percentage of applications which result in awards, compared with the significantly higher numbers for comparable court cases, suggest that flaws in the statute itself limited the EAJA's impact in agency adjudications in its first three years.
For example, the provisions in the original Act governing standards for judicial review of fee decisions were arguably too restrictive. Judicial review of administrative fee adjudications was discretionary with the federal courts and was under an abuse of discretion standard. 40 Congress had feared that a large volume of routine appeals of agency fee denials would flood the federal courts."' But during the three years that this narrow that the NLRB Regional Director's position was not substantially justified because it lacked a reasonable basis in fact, regardless of the legal arguments. The court found that the Regional Director made a factual error in increasing the backpay demand, despite the presence of clear evidence which the Regional Director's office had at the time that should have indicated the error and obviated the need for a hearing.
35. The Congressional Budget Office (OBO) estimated that EAJA awards during fiscal years 1982-84 would be $310 million, based on an estimated 11,200 court awards and 8,100 administrative agency awards. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12, at 4999-5002. The actual amount of all EAJA awards during those three years was less than $4 million and the total number of awards was less than 200. H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 12 at 137.
36. The OBO estimated that awards would be made in some 2,700 administrative cases per year, with an average award of $7,200 for a total cost to the government of S19. 
37.
Between 1982 and 1985 the number of applications granted in U.S. courts increased from 10 to 420. The percentage of applications granted also increased, from less than 50% in 1982 to more than 70% in 1985. The total amount awarded grew from S264,339 to S1,912,768 in that same period. This Section describes current asylum application and adjudication procedure and then reviews the legal debate over whether the EAJA applies to those adjudications. It argues that the EAJA should apply to asylum adjudications by demonstrating that the EAJA's three objectives will be furthered by its use in that context.
A. Asylum Procedure
Asylum is one of two principal forms of statutory relief available to an alien in the United States who claims that she will be persecuted if deported to her country of origin. 7 Asylum is a temporary but highly deleave to appeal unreviewable. Id. 42. From 1982 -1984 the courts granted only four of seven petitions leave to appeal an agency's fee determination, and reversed the agency in only one of those cases. To gain asylum an applicant must first establish eligibility for relief by demonstrating a "well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." '49 Then, the IJ must exercise the discretion delegated by the Attorney General, to grant or deny asylum. 5 0 Asylum adjudication thus involves two separate determinations which are subject to different standards of judicial review. Federal courts review asylum eligibility determinations under a substantial evidence standard and the discretionary determination is reviewed under abuse of discretion." 1 The asylum seeker may follow two different procedural routes to gain asylum but can probably only recover EAJA fees by following the second of these. First, if no deportation proceedings have been instituted against her, she may affirmatively apply for asylum by requesting an interview with the office of the local district director of the INS. 2 In most cases, the EAJA would probably not apply to the district director's decision on an affirmative application for asylum because there is no adversary adjudication and the government is not represented by counsel. 3 tation," under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). In contrast to asylum, the Attorney General is required to withhold deportation if an IJ determines that an alien's freedom would be threatened upon return to her native country on the basis of her "race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id.; see INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984) (alien must show "clear probability of persecution" to be eligible for withholding). Thus withholding of deportation is mandatory if the alien meets the statutory requirements for eligibility. Asylum, by contrast, is discretionary. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1211 n.6. 48. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b) provides that the Attorney General may revoke a grant of asylum if changed conditions in the asylee's country of nationality make him ineligible.
There is no limit on the number of persons who may receive grants of asylum each year, but only 5,000 asylees may become permanent residents in a given year. 53. See infra notes 65-67. When Congress in 1985 expanded the scope of the "position" of the agency which must be substantially justified to include underlying agency action, see supra note 31, it concluded that the government would not be liable for "mere preliminary or procedural decisions which would not be subject to judicial review." H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 12, at 141. Thus, a
The EAJA would, however, apply to appellate review of an asylum claim raised in a second way: during a deportation hearing before an IJ." The decision of the IJ is appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), whose decision may be appealed directly to the federal courts of appeals, and from there to the Supreme Court. 5 The government may be exposed to liability for an EAJA award in asylum hearings for either appealing a grant of asylum by an IJ, 6 or for contesting an asylum seeker's appeal of an IJ denial. 5 " Liability might arise where the court of appeals determines that the IJ or the BIA applied the wrong legal standards or failed to articulate the reasons for a denial of asylum, and the government's argument on appeal lacks substantial justification." 8 This is an unusual posture for EAJA agency adjudications. In other district director's decision would probably not be subject to EAJA coverage because it would be considered a "preliminary decision" not subject to judicial review. 54. Procedurally, two distinct entities within the Justice Department participate in asylum adjudication: 1) The INS, which litigates against asylum seekers and is thus liable for fee awards; and 2) the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), an independent unit of IJs who conduct deportation hearings (the forum in which asylum claims are adjudicated) and the five member BIA, which reviews IJ decisions de novo. In most cases EAJA fees would be available only on appeals of an IJ's decision. See infra notes 56-58.
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1982) . The federal circuit court of appeals reviews asylum eligibility decisions under a "substantial evidence" standard. Id. § 1105 (a)(4).
56. See, e.g., In Re Issam Arabo, (1988) (unpublished IJ decisioh on file with author). In that case the IJ awarded EAJA fees after the INS first appealed the IJ's decision granting Arabo discretionary adjustment of status relief, but then dropped the appeal. The IJ awarded fees only for the work performed by Arabo's attorney contesting the meritless appeal. Id. at 3.
57.
See Sierra Club v. Secretary of the Army, 820 F.2d 513, 520 (1st Cir. 1987) (success at preliminary stages may be some evidence of substantial justification, but not dispositive). A common scenario under which fees might be awarded is if the court of appeals finds the asylum seeker eligible for asylum because the record demonstrates a well-founded fear, but remands for a discretionary determination by the BIA. Success on the eligibility issue would most likely constitute success on a significant issue and the appellant could be eligible for EAJA fees for work performed by his attorney on that issue before the BIA, even though the BIA may have ultimately denied asylum on discretionary grounds.
58. The INS could be liable for EAJA fies in a deportation hearing where no appeal is taken if the asylum seeker contests the grounds for deportation. Suppose the asylum seeker affirmatively applies for asylum and after an interview the district director denies her application. She cannot appeal the decision but thereafter the INS attempts to deport her and she requests a deportation hearing before an IJ. If she contests the grounds for the deportation order and wins, she could apply for EAJA fees for defending against the deportation order in the hearing. Her claim would be that the government's position in prompting the deportation hearing was not substantially justified.
But in many asylum cases, because the asylum seeker concedes the grounds for deportation (thus conceding that the INS's position on deportation is substantially justified), she can probably only win EAJA fees on appeal. By raising her asylum claim as an affirmative request for relief from deportation, the asylum seeker bears the burden of proof establishing that she has a well-founded fear of persecution. Even if she establishes eligibility and is granted asylum by the IJ, the INS can probably not be held not substantially justified for merely opposing the asylum claim in the initial hearing before the IJ, because the applicant is not contesting any action on the government's part that resulted in the deportation hearing. The underlying issue is deportation, which the applicant concedes. In this situation EAJA fees would only be available on appeal of the IJ's decision. administrative settings where the EAJA applies, such as NLRB adjudications, the EAJA award may be made against the government merely for causing the adversary adjudication to be held; the BAJA fee applicant contests the government's action that prompted the adjudication in the first instance. But the fact that BAJA fees will in many asylum cases only be available for work performed on appeals to the BIA or the federal courts of appeals will not limit the Act's effectiveness because so many "asylum cases are won only on appeal. 5 9
B. Escobar Ruiz and the Legal Debate
The INS and the Justice Department have long contended that the EAJA does not apply at all to deportation hearings," 0 but the issue was not tested in court until recently. In Escobar Ruiz I, ' and Escobar Ruiz 11,6 the INS objected to the application of the EAJA to deportation proceedings on two major grounds. First, the INS claimed that the Immigration and Naturalization Act specifically precludes the application of any fee-shifting statute to immigration hearings because the Act gives the alien a right to counsel in such hearings, but not at the government's expense. 1986 ). Plaintiff, a Salvadoran trade unionist, sought asylum but was ordered deported at a hearing in which he appeared pro se. Plaintiff subsequently found pro bono counsel and moved to reopen and file for asylum. Before the circuit court ruled on his appeal, the INS voluntarily reopened the proceedings. Plaintiff then filed for EAJA fees for his attorney's work before the Ninth Circuit and the BIA. applies to administrative proceedings that are "adversary adjudications,'" 6 " and that immigration proceedings are not included within that term."' The court, in Escobar Ruiz II, dismissed this argument as well, reasoning that the legislative history of the EAJA shows that Congress meant to cover this type of proceeding.
67

C. Deterring Routine INS. Opposition to Asylum Claims
In addition to the arguments advanced by the Ninth Circuit, this Note argues for application of the EAJA to asylum proceedings to further the three purposes of the Act: enabling small parties to defend against unjustified government actions, deterring such government action, and improving the quality of government policy through increased exposure to litigation.
Critics have pointed to several aspects of INS asylum procedure and policy that contravene the asylum provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act: ideological biases in asylum determinations," the powerful weight accorded general foreign policy considerations through reliance on State Department advisory opinions on asylum claims, 6 9 and denial of notice of both the right to apply for asylum and the right to counsel in asylum hearings. (1)(0) (Supp. IV 1986) . Thus administrative proceedings are covered by the EAJA if: (1) they are considered adversary adjudications under the APA; and (2) the government is represented in those proceedings by counsel. The government has conceded that it is represented by counsel in deportation hearings. Escobar Ruiz III, 838 F.2d 1020, 1023 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988).
It argues, however, that the phrase "adjudication under section 554 [of the APA]," meant only those proceedings that were governed directly by the APA. Since immigration proceedings are not governed by the APA, the INS claimed that they are thus not covered by the EAJA. In support the INS cited Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) (hearing provisions of the APA do not apply to deportation hearings). Escobar Ruiz II, 813 F.2d 283, 287 (1987) .
67.
The court rejected the argument in favor of Escobar Ruiz's position that "an adjudication under section 554" meant an adjudication as defined under that section. 813 F.2d. at 291. The court reasoned that both interpretations were plausible, but found stronger support for Escobar Ruiz's broader interpretation in the legislative history of the EAJA and in the Statement accompanying the Model Rules for the Implementation of the EAJA. Id. at 289.
The court then held that deportation hearings were adversary adjudications as defined under 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1982) . 813 F.2d at 283, affd Escobar Ruiz III, 838 F.2d 1020 , 1030 (9th Cir. 1988 ). This section defines adjudications as those "required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing. . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 554 (a). Deportation proceedings are required to be on the record after a hearing. 297, 302 (1983) .
Counsel must persuade the refugee to present her testimony in the best possible light to an IJ. This is difficult because asylum seekers often fear and distrust government officials, given their unhappy experiences with authorities in their native countries. Statement of Lynn Alvarez of El Rescate, New York University Conference on Immigration Reform (Mar. 7, 1987 ) (on file with author). Without counsel, asylum seekers tend to make inconsistent and damaging statements to IJs and the INS because they say what they think a particular official wishes to hear at the time. See E. HULL, WrrH-OUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 108 (1985) . REv. 2001 REv. , 2005 REv. -06 (1987 . When the newest and largest (capacity 6000) detention center opened in 1986 in Oakdale, Louisiana-two hundred miles from a major city-there were five attorneys in the town, none of whom had ever taken an immigration case. Interview with Michael Posner, Executive Director of the Lawyers Committee For Human Rights in New York City (Apr. 14, 1986) .
The effect of the INS detention program is to further deny asylum seekers' access to counsel and increase the difficulties they face in understanding their options and applying for asylum. See Second, the EAJA may deter routine INS opposition to asylum claims by exposing the INS to fee awards in cases in which opposition is not justified under the facts or the law. Under the Reagan Administration the INS instituted a new recruitment policy to attract younger and more aggressive trial attorneys, many of them from the Justice Department, to prosecute deportation cases. The result has been vigorous opposition to adjudicated asylum claims, often irrespective of the merits, in contrast to the traditionally passive approach to litigation taken by INS trial attorneys. 8 The deterrent effect of the EAJA may be particularly strong in the asylum context because the INS has already been subject to some of the largest EAJA awards made in civil litigation since the passage of the Act. 79 Since the same INS lawyers who worked on these court cases litigate and supervise individual asylum cases before the BIA, they may have learned from their experiences and change their practices.
Further, the EAJA may deter the INS from considering ideological bias and foreign policy concerns, which, critics contend, continue to dominate the asylum process. 8 0 Evidence suggests, for example, that it is much easier for aliens from Communist nations or countries hostile to the United States to obtain asylum, irrespective of the strength of their individual claims. 81 A prime source of this foreign policy bias is the declining but still significant influence that the State Department has over asylum decisions through the customary issuance of advisory opinions. 8 2 Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 , 1501 -02, 1509 -11 (C.D. Cal. 1988 See Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Smith, 644 F. Supp. 382, 387-88, 393 (S.D. Fla. 1984 ) (awarding $441,000 in EAJA fees where government consciously developed Haitian program to facilitate deportation without consideration of requests for asylum and INS "used its considerable resources to oppress plaintiff class"), affd, 791 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1986 Louis v. Nelson, 646 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D. Fla. 1986 ) (EAJA award exceeding S 1 million for not substantially justified government policy of mass exclusion hearings and detention for all Haitian refugees effected without notice or publication).
80. See supra note 3. 81. A review of cases decided by INS district directors (statistics on asylum adjudications before IJs are not currently available) during the 1987 fiscal year shows that the range of the percentages of asylum grants made (versus the number decided) for applications from nations hostile to the United States was 84% (Syria and Nicaragua) to 20% (Hungary). For seven Western aligned nations the range was 26% to 0.0%, with El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras and the Philippines all below 5%. INS statistics reprinted in REFUGEE REP., Dec. 18, 1987, at 15. 82. IJs and the BIA often defer to the "advisory" opinions issued by the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA), because they lack independent knowledge about political conditions in an asylum seeker's native country. 91, 112-114, 128-33 (1986) REF. 183, 193 (1984) . The State Department opinion became the decisive factor in many asylum Since the advisory opinion usually becomes a part of the record of the asylum hearing, it could be reviewed along with the rest of the government's position to determine whether the INS was substantially justified in contesting an asylum claim. If the INS relied on the advisory opinion, and the opinion stated no individualized reason for recommending against finding eligibility for asylum, the INS could be found liable for an EAJA award for contesting an applicant's case on appeal. Such an award could deter future reliance on the State Department Report.
Finally, availability of the EAJA in asylum adjudications will serve a third EAJA objective by spurring increased litigation of asylum claims and thus promoting greater BIA judicial review and modification of emerging government standards of discretion. After INS v. CardozaFonseca, 3 which significantly liberalized the standards for asylum eligibility, more asylum seekers are passing the eligibility hurdle; thus, more IJs are deciding asylum cases on discretionary grounds. 8 The establishment of standards for the exercise and limitation of discretion through increased litigation will be critical to the success of future asylum seekers. While the standard of judicial review for a discretionary denial of asylum is less stringent (abuse of discretion) than the standard for eligibility determinations (substantial evidence), several appeals of discretionary asylum denials have been successful. J. 127, 141-2 (1986) .
This process disadvantages the asylum seeker because she cannot directly confront the State Department sources at her hearing. Further, the advisbry opinion is often based on a political compromise within the State Department in which U.S. foreign policy objectives, not factors appropriate to individual adjudication as required by the 1980 Refugee Act, control. Preston, supra, at 117-18. In some instances the advisory opinions contain no references to the facts of an individual case. RiosBerrios v. INS, 776 F.2d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1985) (undated advisory opinion on petitioner's asylum claim "containled] no reference to facts of petitioner's case," yet concluded petitioner's fear of persecution not well-founded).
Responding to critics who have urged that the State Department's role in the adjudication process be limited to offering information on general country conditions rather than recommendations on individual cases, see Preston, supra, at 138-40, the INS recently indicated that the State Department will reduce the number of advisory opinions it issues. BHRHA Cuts Down Advisory Opinions, 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1215 (Nov. 2, 1987 . In addition the Justice Department has instructed asylum adjudicators to pose specific questions to the BHRHA in cases in which they are unable to render a decision without advice from the State Department. 53 Fed. Reg. 2893 Reg. (1988 . These regulations may reduce the incidence and influence of non-individualized advisory opinions.
83. 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987) ("well-founded fear" standard for asylum not equivalent to harder to meet "clear probability" of persecution standard for withholding of deportation).
84. See Anker, supra note 50, at 4. In the past, few asylum cases were decided on discretionary grounds, most were based on eligibility. Id.
85. See, e.g., Castro-O'Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1988 ) (in exercise of discretion BIA must make findings; BIA failed to specify facts relevant to its discretionary denial and failed to indicate it had considered any factor other than drug conviction); Shahandeh-Pey v. INS, 831 F.2d 1384 (7th Cir. 1987 ) (BIA failed to weigh or even mention relevant factors in discretionary asylum denial).
Where the law of discretion in asylum cases is dear, for instance that an asylum seeker's manner of entry into the United States is only one of several factors which must be considered in exercising discretion to grant or deny an eligible asylum applicant, Matter of Pula, Interim Dec. No. 3033 (BIA Sept. 22, 1987) , the INS may not be substantially justified in opposing an eligible applicant's appeal from an IJ's adverse denial of discretion based solely on manner of entry.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING THE EAJA IN THE AGENCY CONTEXT
While application of the EAJA to asylum adjudications furthers the purposes of the EAJA by aiding asylum seekers and deterring unjustified INS litigation, the EAJA is not a perfect vehicle for achieving its own goals. This Section discusses two proposed clarifications of the EAJA that would strengthen its application in the asylum context. Both recommendations stem from and build on the 1985 amendments to the EAJA that clarified and liberalized the terms of the original Act to counter restrictive court and agency interpretations. First, Congress should clarify the "substantially justified" standard and overrule the recent restrictive Supreme Court interpretation of the phrase. Second, the Justice Department should prohibit excessive agency review of fee decisions made by IJs or the BIA.
A. Amend the "Substantially Justified" Standard
The leading reason cited for denials of EAJA fee awards is that the government has met its burden of showing that its position was substantially justified."" But the phrase is not defined in the text of the EAJA, and the circuits have split over its interpretation. Prior to the 1985 reenactment, a majority of circuits interpreted "substantially justified" as mere reasonableness. The legislative history of the original EAJA supports this position." 8 But a "more than mere reasonableness" standard is supported by the legislative history of the 1985 EAJA Amendments, 9 although Congress did not actually amend the statutory language. 9 0 Since 86. For fiscal year 1987, 61 per cent of denials in the federal courts were made because a court found substantial justification of the government's position. 1987 Cis. REP. supra note 33, at 101. In agency adjudications, the comparable figure for fiscal year 1985 (the last year for which these figures are available) is 40 per cent. 1985 ACUS REP., supra note 36, at app. V.
87. But some circuits initially held the government to a slightly higher standard than "reasonableness." See Cinciarelli v. Regan, 729 F.2d 801, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1984) .
88. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 12 at 4992 ("The test of whether or not a government action is substantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness. .... the government must show that its case had a reasonable basis in law and fact.").
An important caveat is that the Report concluded that where a prevailing party "has had to engage in lengthy administrative proceedings before final vindication of his or her rights in the courts, the government should have to make a strong showing to demonstrate that its action was reasonable." Id. at 4997 (emphasis added). See NRDC v. EPA, 703 F.2d 700, 712 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying strong showing standard because "EPA knew all along that its position was legally untenable" and finding EPA not substantially justified). This implies a higher than "mere reasonableness" standard for those cases, for instance, in which an asylum seeker had to litigate his clearly meritorious claim case to the federal court of appeals just to establish her eligibility for asylum.
89. See H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 12, at 138. "Because in 1980 Congress rejected a standard of 'reasonably justified' in favor of 'substantially justified,' the test must be more than mere reasonableness." Id.
90. Congress may have believed that the clarification in the House Report, the authoritative legislative history for the 1985 amendments, would suffice to offer the courts direction on interpretation. One commentator has suggested that Congress did not change the language because it felt that the issue was complex and better left to be adjudicated on a case by case basis with guidance from legislative history. [Vol. 97: 1459 partment's resolution of this question in its newly revised EAJA implementing regulations will be particularly important because if the INS decided to add an additional layer of review for fee decisions, few BIA or IJ awards would likely be upheld on review by the EOIR. 10 ' This extra layer of review for fee decisions would require prevailing parties to appeal fee denials or reduced award decisions to the federal courts of appeals on a routine basis, which might deter applicants and decrease the effectiveness of the BAJA in immigration proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
Applying the EAJA in asylum adjudications would serve the objectives of the BAJA by providing monetary incentive to counsel to pursue appeals of meritorious asylum cases; by deterring unreasonable INS opposition in such cases and unreasonable asylum policies challenged in such adjudications; and finally, by exposing more INS asylum decisions to adversarial testing, thus encouraging greater INS compliance with the asylum provisions of the 1980 Refugee Act. The effectiveness of the EAJA in achieving these objectives will depend on how the Justice Department implements the EAJA and on how Congress reacts to the Supreme Court's decision in Pierce v. Underwood. Application of the EAJA is no panacea for the problems faced by asylum seekers in deportation hearings but it may significantly deter unjustified INS opposition to meritorious claims.
generally appealable directly to the federal courts of appeals.
The Administrative Conference of the United States' Model Rules for implementing the EAJA recommend that the fee appeals process in contract appeals board cases conform to the existing merits appeals process. I C.F.R. Alt. § 315.308 (1988) ; see also 1985 ACUS REP., supra note 36, at 7 (Model Rules concluded that new language in EAJA not intended to create a new layer of agency review where none existed before, but rather to preserve existing channels of review), But some agencies rejected the Model Rules approach in their EAJA regulations, allowing the agency to review board EAJA decisions. For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) regulations require that NASA review fee decisions made by the NASA Board of Contract Appeals. 14 C.F. R. § 1262.308 (1988) .
104. The current Justice Department regulations, implemented prior to the EAJA's reenactment, are ambiguous regarding additional review of fee decisions. 28 C.F. R. § 24.307 (1988) . They call for the fee decision of the adjudicative officer (here the IJ or the BIA) to be "reviewed to the extent permitted by law by the Department in accordance with the Department's procedures for the type of proceeding involved. The Department will issue the final decision on the application." Id. The term "Department" is defined as the "relevant Departmental component which is conducting the adversary adjudication," id. at § 24.102(d), which is the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) for asylum adjudications. See supra note 54. The EOIR's procedures for review of asylum adjudications call for direct appeals from the BIA to the federal circuit courts of appeals. Yet the last quoted sentence, mandating that the Department make the final decision on the application, could mean that an additional office or official within the EOIR or perhaps elsewhere in the Justice Department could review the BIA's fee decision.
